Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Chinese and Sumerian by Charles J. Ball

Taken from:
http://www.niamwebs.com/read/?
http://www.archive.org/stream/chinesesumerian00balluoft/chinesesumerian00balluoft_djvu.txt

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INITIAL AND FINAL SOUNDS— THEIR CORRESPONDENCE AND PARALLEL CHANGES That Chinese is related to the old Sumerian language of Babylonia is a con- clusion which appears inevitable, when we notice the great similarity of the two vocabularies. This may perhaps be best exhibited in tabular form. The following list does not, of course, pretend to be exhaustive. Its purpose is merely to weaken any presumption of antecedent improbability ; and so to bespeak an unprejudiced consideration for the arguments and comparisons to follow. CHINESE an, ang, yen, a clear sky. ang, high. pa, pat, pal, to draw water, pan, ban, comrade ; p'eng, pen, bang, friend ; pair, pi, p^t, pit, but, writing-brush ; pen. pit, pieh, p'et, biet, to separate ; to part, p'ien, p"in, bin, carriage (for women), ping, bing, disease ; sick, ping, pen, bing, pin, ice ; cold ; frost. p'ang, p'ong, bang, a heavy fall, of snow or rain. See also m^ng. han, ein, kan, gan, cold ; han-tung, id. yin-tung, to freeze, hei, he, h^k, hik, koku, black ; dark, hien, keing, gan, salt ; bitter, hien, ham, kan, gan, all. ho, ha, ka, ga, to bear ; to carry, hing, kiang, ying, gio, walk ; kien, kfn, id. hiien, ngien, gen, black, huk, hu, uk, koku, dawn ; sunrise, kai, ka, kie, street, k'ai, hoi, k'ae, kai, to open, kan, kon, kiie, stem ; rod ; cane ; pole, &c. kwan, kun, kon, kiie, kou, reed ; bamboo tube, k'an, kan, look at ; see ; examine, k'i, the earth {personified). SUMERIAN AN, AM, EN, the sky; heaven. AN, high. BAL, to draw water. MAN, comrade ; friend ; two. MU ATI, PATI,PA(?), stylus or writing- reed. BAD, to remove ; distant. D UB- BIN, covered car ; litter. PIG (also SIG), weak; weakness. 6aL-BI(N) ; 6aL-BA(N), id. MAM (A-MAM), cold weather. MAM, MAMMI, storm of snow or cold rain. EN-TEN, cold weather. GE, GIG, KUKKU, night; black. GIN, bitter (C. T. xii. 30). GAN A, all. GA, to lift, bear, carry. GIN, to walk; G\y[Jd. GIN, black (C. T. xii. 30) ; KAN, id. UG, day (C. T. xii. 6) : from GUG. KAS-KAL, road. GAL, to open. GIN, GI, reed; stem, &c. IGI-GAN, to see ; behold ; inspect. KI, the earth. PRELIMINARY LIST OF SIMILAR WORDS CHINESE k'i, this. (2) Precaiive Particle. kin, an axe. (2) a pound weight. kin, metal ; gold. kien, kfn, ken, kon, to establish. kien, kfn, k'en, a donkey. k'ien, hfn, k'en, ken, to send. k'ien, k'fm, k'em, kin, ken, black. kien, kfn, ken, to see. kiin, kuen, kwan, ken, to love ; ngen, en, ang, eng, in, on, un, en, kindness ; affection ; ngdn-ngai, affection (of the sexes), kou, mouth, k'ou, milk, k'un, kwen, kon, kun, elder brother ; hiung, hing, kei, id. kung, tribute, kung, work. kwan, kun, kon, ruler ; mandarin, kwo, kwok, kuk, country ; nation, k'wo, kwat, kwal, broad ; wide, k'iit, ket, kiiet, cut off; decide, lai, rai, to come, lik, li, strength. Ifm, lien, kiam, ken, the face. 1ft, Heh, yol, gust ; squall. lut, lii, a law ; rule ; fa-lu, fat-lut, fap-lut, laws and statutes, len, lin, ning, dei, peace, ma, weights, — of commerce. ma, twins (Chalmers 91). man, full ; kan, fullness ; overflow. m^k, mai, muk, mik, black. min, people. min, men, ming, merciful; compassionate ; wen, un, kind, ming, brightness, ming, meng, mei, a name, meng, moung, maong, dream, meng, mung, bong, drizzling rain ; ming, men, id. mi, not ; mei, id. ; wu, mou, mu, id. mft, met, mieh, blood, mu, male, mu, muk, wood ; a tree. {Phon. also KU-T: P. 278.) SUMEKIAN GE, this. (2) Precative Particle. GIN, an axe. (2) a shekel (GE). GUSH-KIN, gold. GIN, to establish. SHA-KAN; (G)AN-SHU. KIN, to send. GIN; KAN, black. KIN, to look to ; see to. KIN-GAD, to love. {Also read YA-hVi, KI-EM, KI-AG = ki-ang.) KA, mouth. GA, milk. U-RUN, U-RIN {character also read GIN : C. T. xii. 30), brother. GUN, tribute. KIN, charge; commission; work, GUN, U-GUN. lord. UG {from GUG) : C. T. xii. 27. DA-GAL, broad ; wide. KUD, cut off; decide. RA, LA 6, to walk, go, &c. LIG, strong. A-LAM,A-LAN, image; likeness; GIM, DIM, zfl'. LIL, storm-wind. BIL-LUD (BAL-LUD; BAB-LUD?), divine commands ; laws. SI-LIM {also read DI), peace. MA, MA-NA, the mina or standard weight. MASH, MASH-MASH, twin(s). MAL {from MAN), to be full ; GAN, abundant. MI;SU-MUG. (F/fl'.hei, black.) MULU (MUL = MUN), man. MUNU, goodness; kindness. MUNU, MUL ( = MUN), flame. MUN, MU, a name. MAMU, dream. MAMMI, shower of rain or snow. ME, NAM-ME ; MU. not. MUD, blood. MU, male. MU, wood ; a tree. {Also read GU : C. T. xii. 30.) PRELIMINARY LIST OF SIMILAR WORDS CHINESE mu [from mu-k), mother. mu, muk, tend cattle ; shepherd. mu, mou, wu, sorcerer. nga, ngwa, wa, tiles ; glazed bricks. ngan,^ I ; ngo, wo, nga, ga ; wu, ngu, ngou, ngo, I, me ; my. ngi, i, er (ur), the ear. ni, li, yi, t'i, grease ; fat. niang, niong, nong, woman ; lady. nfm, nien, nydm, niom, to repeat or recite, e.g. charms, liturgies, &c. nfn, nien, nieng, nen, a year. ngu, niu, giu, ox. san, swan, a box ; a basket. shak, shek, shi, sik, zi, zah, t'ak, stone. sheng, a sage ; a Prophet, san, swan, slin, son, to reckon, seng, a priest, shik, shit, shih, to eat ; food. shi [from shik), si, swine. shou, su, the hands. shu, writing ; book. sik, si, to split ; divide. sik, si, J. seki, formerly; of old. sin, sien, sen, before ; ancient. sfn, sien, si, hsien, to wash. sin, sien, sen, tien, sleet. sing, seng, hsing, smell ; odorous ; rank. sing, a name. sing, form ; figure. sing, a star. sung, pines, firs, &c. sung, to give. suk, su, J. soku, shoku, grain. siit, set, siok, hswik, sheh, snow ; ice. T'ai-poh, the planet Venus ; T'e-bah. tan, only ; single. te, tek, tik, toku, to get. ting, adult male. t'ien, t'fn, t'ieng, ten, heaven. t'ien, t'fn, diefi, tieng, ten, a field. tien, tin, tieng, ten, mad ; raving. SUMERIAN MUG, parent of either sex; U-MU,- mother. MU, shepherd (S-^ 308) [?]. MU, charm ; spell ; incantation. GA-R, MA-R ( = WA-R), flat bricks. GAL (=GAN); GIN; GAE, MAE ; GA, MA ; MU, I, me; my. GE ; BUR ( = MUR, WUR) ; the ear. NI, LI, I, lA, oil; fat; anoint. {Also read DIG.) NIN, lady. I-NIM, E-NEM, utterance, prayer, spell or incantation. LIM, a year, — of office [?]; As. limmu, limu. GU, GUD, ox. PI-SAN, a box ; a coffer, &c. DAG, DIG, SI, ZA, values of the char, for stone. GA-SHAM, wise, — in oracles, &c. SAM, SAN, reckoning ; price. SANGU, a priest. SHUKU.food; SUG-SUG,SUD-SUD, to eat (Br. 6058). SHAG, SIg, swine. SHU, thehand(s). SHU, writing; the scribe's art. SIG, SI, to split; divide. SIG, SI, old. SUN, old. SH UN-SHUN, pure. TEN in EN-TEN A, cold. IR-SIM, fragrance ; sweet odour. SIM, to call ; to name. SIG ( = SING), form; figure. SIG, bright; light. SHIM (cDet. GISH, tree), scented trees. SUM, SUN, SIG, SI, to give. SHUG, SHE, grain. SHED, SID, SHEG, SHE, frost; snow; ice (C.T. xii. 11); IM-SHESH, id.; A-SHUGI, frost. DIL-BAD ; JeAf^ar {Hesych). TAN, Del. after Numerals. TUG, TUKU, to get. TIN, MU-TIN, a male; a man. I-DIM; (I-D IN), heaven. E-DIN, the field, steppe, &c. I-DIM, mad ; raging. B 2 PRELIMINARY LIST OF SIMILAR WORDS CHINESE tip, tiap, tie, tablets ; documents. ts'e, tsah, chak, chaik, shoku, the side. ts'i, zi, dzi, ch'i, even ; correct ; regular. ts'iin, ch'iian, sen, zen, all. tung, winter ; tung, to freeze. t'ung, tong, dung, copper ; brass. tung, to move ; motion. t'ung, dung, a boy. tzu, chu, ti, a child. lit, yiie, moon ; month. wu, u, uk, house ; chamber. wei, vi, to do ; to make. wen, m€n, written characters. yet, ngyit, nyit, the sun. yu. "gii. gio, fish. yii, ngu, to talk ; speech. yiian, yen {from gon), a garden. SUMERIAN DUB, a clay tablet ; inscribed document. ZAG, the side ; TIG, id. ZI, ZIG, ZID, right. Z UN, all; Sign of Plur. TEN, in EN-TEN, cold. SHUN, SHEN, copper (skinnu). TUM, to walk ; to go. DUMU, DAMU, achild. DU, child. ITU, ITI, id. {AISS,, Hesych) MU (C. T. xii. 8); U, house. ME (C. T. xii. lo), to do ; to make. DIM-MEN, foundation-inscription ; (2) foundation (Turkish temel). UD, UTU, id. {from GUD). ku, a fish (C. T. xii. 27). GU, to say; speak ; speech. GAN, garden; field. INITIAL AND FINAL SOUNDS— THEIR CORRESPONDENCE AND PARALLEL CHANGES It is evident that the preceding list presents at a glance sufficient similarity between the material of the two languages to suggest at once the hypothesis of relationship. But if we look below the surface, as Philology justifies us in doing, we shall discover in Chinese a large number of vocables which, although they have become dissimilar in the natural course of phonetic change, were originally either identical with the corresponding sounds of the primitive Sumerian speech, or at all events manifestly akin to them. In fact, much as Philology justifies us in connecting the Latin aqua with the French eau, so it may justify us in connecting the Chinese ho, river, with the Sumerian ID, I, river, and CjAL, to flow ; although the three terms possess not a letter in common. When it is pointed out that the character ^ ho is still read ka or ga in the traditional Japanese pronunciation, which is more faithful to the ancient sounds of the Chinese, and that the kindred Mongol word for river is gol, Manchau hoi ; we see at once that the Chinese initial h represents, as indeed is usual, an older k (from a yet earlier g), and that the lost final of the root is 1 or a related sound. It thus appears likely that the Chinese ho, river, is akin to the Sumerian GAL, to flow. But, further, the Sumerian ID, I, river, which occurs in the name I.DIGNA, Assyrian Idiglat, the Tigris, is really a worn form of GID, as is shown by the Hebrew transcription Vpin Khiddeqel ; and this earlier GID suggests a primary GAD, cognate with GAL, to flow, and identical with the old Chinese kat, gat, river (cf P. 145). INITIAL AND FINAL SOUNDS, ETC. ^ Take another instance, ^ ho, fire, was formerly ka, as we learn again from the Japanese pronunciation ; and the Mongol gal, fire, again suggests the loss of a final dental (Mongol 1 = Chinese t). Thus kat, or gat, emerges as the oldest form of the Chinese word for fire. But instead of a guttural initial, the dialects present a labial sound ; Cantonese and Hakka fo, Wenchow fu, implying an earlier pa, ba : others exhibit transitional sounds, Mandarin hwo, Fuchau hwi ; c/. Korean and Annamite hwa (ga = gwa = wa). The Chinese sounds, therefore, appear to suggest gat (gal) and bat (bal) as their biform original. Now the Sumerian character for fire was read IZ (from GIZ, GAZ ; GUZ, c/. USSl), IZI, fire; and BI, to kindle, to flare up; and PIL (from BIL, BAL), to burn. We find also the compounds GI.BIL, burning, light; and GISH.BAR, dialectic MU.BAR, fire. The Fire-god was called BIL.GI (from BAL.GI), later GI.BIL; and GISH.BAR. BAR and BAL in this sense are evidently related to each other, and to BAR, dialectic MASH, to shine ; while GAZ is akin to GAR, light. And it is equally clear that the old Chinese sounds gat, bat, closely correspond to the Sumerian (G)IZ (GAZ), GAR, and BIL (BAL), BAR. With BI, to kindle, cf. the Japanese hi, fire, from bi, pi, and with BAR, Jap. abure, to roast. As regards the interchange of sounds, the transition from a guttural to a labial initial is a common feature of both languages. A good example may be seen in the Sumerian USH (from GUSH), blood, and what we may call its M-form, MUD, blood ; a pair of words which are perfectly represented by, or preserved in, the Chinese hiieh and mieh, blood. That the older sound of hiieh was kut, is inferred from the Jap. ket-si, compared with Cantonese hiit and Hakka het {see G. 4847) ; and kut = GUD, GUSH. As for mieh (G. 7880), it is surely enough to adduce the Cantonese myt, Hakka met, Jap. bet-si or me-chi, Annamite miet, to confirm the suggestion of its close kindred with the Sumerian MUD, blood. There can be little doubt, one would think, that the Sumerian (G)USH and MUD, on the one hand, and their Chinese equivalents hiieh-hut and mieh-myt, on the other, although given in the dictionaries as mutually independent words, are really related to each other in much the same way as GISH and MESH, GU and MU, tree, wood, are related in Sumerian, or as ho and fo, fire, or ngo and wo, I, in Chinese. One is simply a labialized form of the other. The Chinese Phonetics have preserved many vestiges of such philological counterparts. Thus in Sumerian, ^^, the character denoting black and night, had the sounds GA, GE, GIG, and MI (from MIG, MUG). Accordingly, we find that the Chinese M (P. 862) has the Phonetic values kek and mek. By itself, the character is read hei or h^ or ho, C. hak, H. het, W. he, hah, hek, K. hik, J. koku, black {see G. 3899) ; and with the Radical or Determinative j^ earth, it is ^ mo, mek, met, meik, mai, me, muk, me, K. mik, J. boku and moku, A. mak, ink ; black ; obscure (G. 8022). It will be noticed that the vowel-variation resembles that of the values of the Sumerian prototype, GA, GE, GIG, MI, KUKKU. Of course, the sound 6 INITIAL AND FINAL SOUNDS, ETC. belongs to the Phonetic ^. The Radical, added later for distinction's sake, has nothing to do with sound, but only with sense.

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Linguistic Correspondence: Nahuatl and Ancient Egyptian

By
Charles William Johnson

Science in Ancient Artwork
Extract Nº. 43

Linguistic Correspondence:
Nahuatl and Ancient Egyptian

by
Charles William Johnson

In our more detailed analyses of the possible correspondence among words of the ancient Egyptian language and nahuatland maya, we have seen that some word-concepts are almost exactly the same in phonetic values. Furthermore, the maya glyphs and ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs share extremely common designs in similar/same word-concepts.
Today, the idea of linguistic correspondence among the Indo-European languages is a widespread fact. From the still unknown Indo-European mother language it is thought came Sanskrit (and the contemporary languages of Pakistan and India); Persian; and Greek, Latin (and many contemporary European languages). The correspondence of similar/same words among the Latin languages is quite visible, with Spanish words, for example, resembling those of French, Italian and Portuguese. English resembles the Teutonic ones, such as, German, Dutch and the Scandinavian languages.
On the other hand, no apparent linguistic correspondence has been observed between ancient Egyptian and languages such as nahuatl or maya, at least to any significant scholarly degree. In the aforementioned essay, we have examined numerous correspondences between word-concepts (and some glyphs) between the ancient Egyptian language and the maya system. The word for day name in maya is ahau, which means place or time in ancient Egyptian. Hom is ballcourt in maya; hem means little ball in ancient Egyptian. Ik means air in maya ; to suspend in the air is ikh in ancient Egyptian. Nichim signifies flower in maya; nehem means bud, flower in ancient Egyptian. And so on, for hundreds of word-concepts that we have examined in the comparison of these two languages.
When similar kinds of linguistic correspondences were perceived by William Jones, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, between Sanskrit and other languages, such examples were sufficient to convince scholars that all of those languages probably came from a mother tongue, the Indo-European language. Today, when linguistic correspondence is observed between the ancient Mesoamerican languages and ancient Egyptian, scholars are unwilling or hesitant to accept the idea that the same laws of linguistics may apply. The reason for this is quite simple: there is no historical basis for considering the possibility that the peoples of these different languages had any physical contact among themselves. Physical contact among the peoples who descended from the Indo-European family is established by historical data. There is no obvious historical data to think that the peoples of ancient Mesoamerica and the peoples of ancient Egypt ever met or came into physical contact with one another.
Nevertheless, historical data aside for the moment, let us examine some of the obvious examples of linguistic correspondence between nahuatl and the ancient Egyptian language.
One very obvious characteristic of the nahuatl language is the extensive use of the letter "l" in most of the words, either as ending to the words or juxtaposed to consonants and vowels within the words. One of the very apparent characteristics of the ancient Egyptian language is the almost total absence of the use of the letter "l" within most of its word-concepts. The letter "l" appears as an ending of words only a handful of times in E.A. Wallis Budge's work, An Egyptian Hieroglyphic Dictionary. It would appear that this very dissimilar characteristic between these two languages would discourage anyone from considering a comparative analysis of possible linguistic correspondence between these two very apparently distinct idioms.
However, as we eliminate the letter "l" from the nahuatl words, the remaining phonemes (listed in brackets) resemble the phonemes and morphemes of ancient Egyptian in many cases. Let us offer only a few of such examples to consider a possible linguistic correspondence between these two fascinating systems of human speech.

Nahuatl

Egyptian


canoe	ACAL [aca-]

	AQAI	boat (page 139b from Budge's work cited above)
reed	ACATL[acat-]

AKHAH-T

reed (139b)

reed (8a)
a well	AMELLI [ame-i]

	AMAM	place with water in them, wells (121b)
house	CALLI [ca-i]

	KA	house (783a)
serpent ...	COATL [coat-] .... ...

KHUT
...
...

snake (30b)
....
...

Linguistic correspondence between nahuatl and ancient Egyptian appears to represent a smoking gun; that is, a trace of evidence that these two peoples did enjoy some kind of contact between themselves ages ago. The fact that we have no real evidence of said contact, or that we have been unable to find any such evidence, should not serve as the basis for denying the possibility of that contact. To attribute all of these similarities in sound, symbol and meaning to mere happenstance seems to be a very unscientific way of resolving an annoying issue. To admit the possibility of physical contact between these cultures has implications for our own interpretation of history and the aspect of technological development of our societies. Such fears are unfounded, given the already obvious fact that our technical know-how could probably not reproduce and build something as majestic as the Great Pyramid.

Did the Phoenicians Discover the New World?

THE PHOENICIAN THEORY

Phoenician naval history begins in about the fourteenth century BC, and they came to be so famous that Solomon asked king Hiram of Tyre to send him carpenters to build a Red Sea fleet, together with sailors to lead this fleet to the land of Ophir (Old Testament, Kings I, 9.26).

The geographical location of Ophir is described in exactly the same way as the Land of Punt. Both countries lie ‘far away, to the south-east'; the ships set sail from a port on the Red Sea and the round voyage lasts three years in both cases. The goods brought from Ophir are more or less the same as those the Egyptians brought from Punt and their other ports of call: gold, precious woods, incense, spices, slaves etc. (Avezac – Macaya Marie Armand Pascal d': Memoire de le pays d'Ophir où les flotes de Salomón aillent chercher l'or, in l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres 30, Paris, 1864; Richard Hennig: Terrae Incognitae, Vol 4, Leiden, Brill, 1950).

We shall follow the Phoenicians with the help of Paul Gallez (La Cola del Dragón, p 150 onwards). He says that as Solomon was the pharaoh's son-in-law, it was only natural that his wife should have obtained sufficient information from her father to organise an expedition to the Land of Punt or a neighbouring country. In any case, it was the Phoenicians who made up the crews of the Egyptian fleets and were in charge of the running of the ships, before they took on the same role in Solomon's fleet. The Phoenicians, even more than their Egyptian or Hebrew bosses, were perfectly aware of the benefits of sailing to the Far East and so it was only natural that they would want to undertake their own trading expeditions.

It might be asked how their fleets would have had access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean when their country only occupied a tiny stretch of the Mediterranean coasts. There are several possible answers, says Gallez. The Phoenicians originated from the Persian Gulf, from where they travelled to modern-day Lebanon. Their first expeditions could have taken place from the Persian Gulf, prior to this migration. In the sixth century, Phoenicia was incorporated into Cyrus's Persia, and the Phoenicians were once again able to sail from the Persian Gulf in fleets that were officially Persian, but in actual fact Phoenician. For more than a thousand years, and under several different flags, the Phoenician fleets sailed across the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Their sailors could well have left Phoenician inscriptions in the countries they visited, even when they were sailing under the orders of a non- Phoenician ruler (Lienhardt Delekat: Phönizier in Amerika, Bonn 1960).

What leads us to this Phoenician theory is a series of remains thought to be Phoenician in several South American countries.

Dick Edgar Ibarra Grasso has identified two Phoenician ships on the centre slabs of the temple of Sechim, in the Casma Valley, on the coast of Peru (La Representación de América en mapas romanos de tiempos de Cristo, Buenos Aires, 1970, pages 175-177). These ruins are generally considered to be some three thousand years old. Other monoliths in the area show a large ocean-going craft and a sextant (Julio C. Tello: Arqueología del valle de Casma, Lima 1956).

Even more extraordinary are the discoveries made by Bernardo Silva Ramos. This author, president of the Manaus Geographical Institute, spent over twenty years in the Amazon rainforest, searching for, photographing and copying 2,800 stone inscriptions, identifying the majority of them as Phoenician and others as Greek (Bernardo de Azevedo da Silva Ramos; Inscriçôes e tradiçôes da América pre-histórica, especialmente do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Imprenta Nacional, 1930).

The oriental scholar Lienhardt Delekat (Phönizier in Amerika, Bonn 1969) has established that the characters on the Paraíba Stone are of Canaanite origin (the former town of Paraíba is now called Joao Pessoa and is the capital of the state of Paría, to the south of the Cape of Sâo Roque in Brazil). The stone, which broke into four pieces after it was discovered on a plantation, totally disappeared, but copies of the inscription were made before this occurred. It was discovered on September 11, 1872 and might well be proof that Phoenician sailors reached Brazil two thousand years before the official discovery of America.

We owe the most detailed study of the inscription on the Paraiba stone to Delekat of Bonn University (Paul Gallez: Predescubrimientos de América, Bahía Blanca, Instituto Patagónico 2001, p 41 onwards). The author analyses all the grammatical forms in the text, comparing it to Aramaic, ancient Hebrew, Sidonian and other Canaanite dialects, especially in respect to the form of the imperfect consecutive.

Delekat comes to the conclusion that the passage is written in ancient Tyro-Sidonian, dating from the end of the sixth century BC. Lienhardt Delekat's translation reads as follows: ‘We are children of Canaan, from the city of Sidon. We are a nation of traders. Our ship is beached on this far-off mountainous coast and we want to make a sacrifice to the gods and goddesses. In the 19^th year of Irma's reign, we set sail from Ezlon Geber across the Red Sea, with ten ships. We have been sailing now for two years and we have sailed all around this land, both hot and far from the hands of Baal (i.e. cold), and twelve men and three women have arrived here, because ten of the women have died on another coast, because they had sinned. May the gods and goddesses be favourable to us'.

The translations given by Netto, Schlottmann and Gordon vary in their interpretation of some of the words. The king Hiram referred to would have been Hiram III, and the nineteenth year of his reign corresponds to 532BC (Heinke Sudhoff: Sorry Columbus. Bergisch Gladbach, Lübbe, 1990). His study of the passage leads Delekat to an unexpected conclusion; the Phoenician sailors would have reached Brazil from the Pacific, sailing to the south of the Bering Strait and to the south of Cape Horn (cold zones) and between the two, along the coasts of Central America (hot zone).

Whether they were at the service of the Hebrews the Egyptians or the Persians, there is not the least doubt that Phoenician vessels would have been capable of crossing the Pacific using favourable currents and winds. The Egyptian ships had a capacity of 6,500 tonnes, like that of Ptolemy IV Philopator (222-205 BC); in fact the Hebrew historian Flavius Josephus talks of ships capable of carrying six hundred passengers and cargo as well as their crew (Paul Hermann: Las Aventuras de los primeros descubrimientos, Barcelona, Labor, 1967; Jacques de Mahieu: La agonía del dios-sol, Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1977).

Ibarra Grasso has compared the eastern Mediterranean trading ships of the third century BC with ships painted on Mochica pottery in northern Brazil. These ships are virtually identical and are mainly characterised by a bridge running all the way from prow to stern, laden with jars of wine, oil etc. It should be pointed out that this type of vessel is still used today in the Aegean Sea and in Indo-China, but as far as we know, has never been used in Peru. It was left to a present-day pre-historian to make this discovery in the Mochica pictures and find an explanation (Dick Edgar Ibarra Grasso; La Representación de América en mapas romanos de tiempos de Cristo, Buenos Aires, 1970; Al-Masudi; Kitab al tanbih wa'l-Israf and Michael Jan de Goeje; Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol 8, Leiden, Brill).

The Egyptian and Phoenician Ships that sailed from the Red Sea had to follow the traditional route, calling at Malabar, Taprobane (Ceylon) and the Golden Chersonese (Malayan peninsula) on to Zabai in Borneo and from there make the best use of the South Pacific currents to reach Cattigara, which we will situate in Peru to facilitate calculations; the return voyage would have been made using the equatorial currents to reach Borneo and the rest of the journey would have been the same as their outward journey. This would have meant a distance of 21,058 sea miles (39,000 km) on the outward voyage and 18,358 sea miles (34,000 km) on their return one, a distance of 39,416 sea miles (73,00 km) in all.

Now, Herodotus (The History, Book IV; G.E. Gerini: Early Geography if Indo-China, Journal of the Royal Society, 1897) says that the ships of that period normally sailed a distance of 70,000 orguias (fathoms) by day, and another 60,000 by night, in all, 130,000 orguias (fathoms) in a day's run, every twenty-four hours. He then uses these data to calculate the width of the Black Sea. Paul Gallez states that he has used the same method to make an approximate calculation of how long a voyage to Cattigara would take. The 130,000 orguias are the same as 240 km, which Hennig reduces to 200 km so as to leave a margin for any eventuality that might have arisen during the crossing. Based on these figures, the 73,000- kilometre journey would have taken 365 days of actual sailing time (Richard Hennig: Terrae Incognitae I, 4 volumes, Leiden, Brill, 1950; Georges Grosjean and Rudolf Kinauer: Kartenkunst und Kartentenik vom Altertum bis zum Barock, Bern and Stuttgart, Hallwag, 1970).

The three years given as the total length of the voyages both to Punt and Ophir (Kings I, 10 11,22) left two years for ports of call, their stay in Cattigara and possible loss of time due to storms and repairs. While we have not taken into account unfavourable winds, neither have we allowed for favourable winds nor the great advantage offered by the circular currents prevailing in the South Pacific. These calculations prove, says Gallez, that a voyage to Cattigara would have been perfectly feasible in those times.

Incidentally, there is another interesting fact; we have said above that the outward and return journeys would total 39,416 sea miles (73,000 km), and if we take a modern map to calculate the distance between Suez and Panama, calling at Aden, Freemantle and Wellington, we discover that the actual distance is 15,765 miles for the outward leg, that is to say, over 31,000 sea miles when we include the return journey. The conclusion, says Paul Gallez, is unquestionable: the Phoenicians pre-discovered America in the first millennium AD.

Quadrant de doble arc / Cuadrante de doble arco / Double arch quadrant (Cortesía: Fundació Jaume I, Nadal, 1991)

THE MYSTERY OF THE DRAGON'S TAIL

Paul Gallez declares that the recognition of the river system in the Dragon's Tail, the total identification of all the rivers of South America in Martellus's 1489 Ptolemy projection, with neither one too few nor one too many, offers conclusive proof of our interpretation. At first sight, the ‘resemblance' of certain rivers on the map with the actual South American river system might be put down to coincidence. However, in the case of the Paraná- Paraguay system, quite unique in the world in its shape, direction, size and position relative to the coast, chance is quite out of the question. As for the other rivers, they offer mutual confirmation and, as if this were not sufficient, the distortion grid applied to Henricus Martellus's Dragon's Tail confirms the hydrographical analysis, completes it with the addition of new lakes and rivers and permits the identification of several capes. The Dragon's Tail on the Martellus map has gone from proto-cartography to cartography. The theory of forged maps, Paul Gallez goes on to say, immediately arises when we remember the famous story of the map of Vinland acquired by Yale University. The theory cannot work for the Martellus maps. In this case, it would have been necessary to forge the map kept in the British Library as well as the map belonging to the University of Leiden in precisely the same way, and this would quite clearly have been impossible. In any case, why would anybody have forged both maps? To show that the Dragon's Tail is actually South America?

Christopher Columbus, Hojeda, Vespucci and maybe even Magellan believed that this was so, but none of them could have drawn the courses of the great South American rivers further inland, since they were completely unknown to them.

Not even a hypothetical sixteenth century forger could have added to the map the three Patagonian rivers, Colorado, Negro or Chubut, since they were not discovered and recognised until much later, the end of the eighteenth century in the case of the Negro and the nineteenth century for the other two. Dr. Gallez believes that the identification of the Dragon's Tail with South America was lost and forgotten at the end of the sixteenth century until Enrique de Gandía (Primitivos navegantes vascos, Buenos Aires) rediscovered it in 1942. By then it would have been too late to forge the London and Leiden maps.

We should also remember that the al-Khwarizmi map belongs to the Arab world, quite distinct from the European and Mediterranean worlds where Martellus worked. Al-Khwarizmi's Dragon's Tail has so many points in common with that of Martellus that we are undoubtedly dealing with the same continent; we are dealing with South America. So, in the same way, al-Khwarizmi's Dragon's Tail goes from proto-cartography to cartography.

As for the identification of the South American Pacific coastline in Ptolemy and Marinus of Tyre, this was known to geographers between 1489 and 1574 and was shown once again by Ibarra Grasso and Enrique de Gandía.

The proto-historic repercussions are immense, says Gallez, and adds that the Martellus map is far superior to the maps of South America that were known of during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially in the case of the Patagonian rivers, Colorado, Negro and Chubut and the river Grande in Tierra del Fuego. ‘The very existence of this map prior to Columbus's voyage, says Gallez, implies pre-discovery expeditions and a detailed knowledge of the inland area of the continent'. We must remain in the realms of proto-history on this point. We cannot consider it history because the numerous theories we have gathered together or evolved so far have not been proved beyond all doubt, however many archaeological or linguistic items appear to support them.

Paul Gallez goes on to say that it has been absolutely impossible to find the sources of information for Martellus's 1489 map, since the possible presence of Egyptian, Phoenician or Chinese traders on the Pacific coast of South America hardly means that they would have travelled all over the continent and correctly drawn up its map. We know that Martellus's map belongs to the world of true cartography, since we have identified rivers mountains and capes, but at the same time, we have not reached even proto-history, as we have not been able to devise any theory about the expeditions which have permitted the drawing up of so perfect a map. As for the proto-historic problems arising from the existence of the Martellus map, Paul Gallez breaks them down into the following questions:

Date of the pre-discovery. We shall give the name pre-discovery to the expedition that contributed most in gathering the information that Martellus then transferred to his map. Did this take place only a short time before the map was drawn up, in the fifteenth century? Did it take place before 1428, when the infante Dom Pedro of Coimbra came back from Venice or Rome with a map showing the Patagonian Strait? Did this occur much further back in time and it was the Egyptians, the Phoenicians or the Chinese, or others we have, as yet, not even thought of?
Exploration of the Atlantic coast. We have Jacques de Mahieu's theory that attributes its exploration to the Vikings (Drakkares en el Amazonas, Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1978 [Drakkar is a Scandinavian word sometimes used to refer to the Viking ships with a dragon's head on the stem, by way of a figurehead]); that of Dick Edgar Ibarra Grasso, who proposes the Genovese (América del Sur en un mapamundi de 1489, Revista de Historia de América, no. 101, January-June 1986, 7-36, Mexico), and numerous other interpretations produced over the last centuries, all of which have been set out and rejected by José Imbelloni (La Segunda esfinge indiana, Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1956).
Inland Exploration. There are several competing proto-historic theories; Barry Fell proposes the Egyptians, Bernardo de Azevedo Silva Ramos, Dick Edgar Ibarra Grasso and Lienhardt Delekat the Phoenicians, Mahieu the Vikings, etc. The problem is a difficult one, because Martellus knew of all the great South American rivers, including those of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego.
Which culture was informed of the discovery? This question depends on the previous ones. If the Pharaohs knew the secrets of America, this knowledge could have been lost just as occurred with the route to the Land of Punt, whether or not this was America, and the secrets of the Great Pyramid. In exactly the same way, the Phoenicians lost their trading secrets when the world situation forced them to abandon their Far East voyages. The voyages made by the Chinese were turned into legends when their internal wars put an end to their transoceanic expeditions.
Who carried this information to Italy? The question has several possible answers, outlined below, says Paul Gallez. The Franciscans of the Middle Ages might have obtained the information in China and carried it to Rome. Relations between the two nations were especially close during the period when Montecorvino was archbishop. The Venetians and the Florentines traded extensively with Alexandria during the latter part of the Middle Ages and might there have come into possession of ancient knowledge that had been kept more or less secret. All these theories are extremely weak, but no others exist. The field is wide open for researchers on the Middle and Far East.
How did Henricus Martellus (Heinrich Hammer) get hold of this information? Once the information reached Italy, this would have been an easy matter, since the German mapmaker Martellus worked in an official capacity, both in Florence and in Rome. He must have been on excellent terms with the Catholic Church, because he had belonged to the school of Cardinal Nicholas de Cusa, the scholarly bishop of Brixen who was deeply involved in Vatican affairs. We know nothing about his connections with Florentine merchants, but it is obvious that the mapmaker and the traders would have shared a common interest, to learn more about the Far East, land of the spice trade.

It is a matter of a series of interconnected questions, all proto-historic. We can evolve possible theories but we cannot insist on having proof because there is none. Paul Gallez says, ‘it would be an error of judgement to attempt to apply the rules of historical criticism too rigorously to proto-historic theories. Such a procedure would only lead to the destruction of all the theories, which would be of no benefit to anyone'.

A weak hypothesis invites us to carry on looking for new information, offer new interpretations to old data, to think about both one's own and other people's theories, to probe deeper into their interconnections, to search out new paths that link and intertwine and may perhaps support each other.

In conclusion, Paul Gallez says: ‘In direct opposition to these theories that must stay for now in the realms of proto-history, the new cartographic facts stand out; the presence of South America on the maps of Martellus, al-Khwarizmi and Marinus of Tyre. All else is an unsolved mystery; the Mystery of the Dragon's Tail.'

nitoverdera@arrakis.es

Tuesday, May 3, 2011

Vedantist Metaphysics

Esoterism and Cosmology

By Wolfgang Smith

There are doctrinal conflicts which can only be resolved on an esoteric plane. In the present article I propose to reflect upon one such conflict: the antithesis, namely, between a geocentric and a heliocentric worldview. It happens, however, that there is more than one geocentrism, even as there are several distinct kinds of heliocentrism. It is necessary, therefore, to sort out these various conceptions, which pertain to different levels and must not be confounded: only then can we grasp the crux of the problem.

In the first place it is needful, once again, to distinguish between two very different ways of knowing: the way of cognitive sense perception, which takes us into the corporeal domain, and the modus operandi of physical science, which gives access to what I term the physical universe.[1]

This said, it becomes apparent that the primary geocentrism-the geocentrism which is natural to mankind-is based upon the first way of knowing: looking up at the sky, one actually perceives the stars and planets circling the Earth, while the Earth itself is experienced as central and immobile. In regard to the second way of knowing, one generally takes it for granted that science has come down unequivocally on the side of heliocentrism. It happens, however, that contemporary physics does allow a geocentric hypothesis: the notion, namely, that the Earth does not move, does not indeed orbit around the Sun; according to Einsteinian relativity, no experiment can possibly prove otherwise. Admittedly, this is not much of a geocentrism; but so far as the scientific way of knowing is concerned, it is the most that can be said: physical geocentrism, let us call it, to distinguish the latter from the primary kind. To be sure, there is also a physical heliocentrism, which affirms that it is likewise admissible to consider the Sun to be at rest and the Earth to orbit around the Sun. On the level of physical theory, thus, there is no conflict between the two positions, which is to say that both derive support from the principles of relativity. I have argued elsewhere that these principles, which appear to hold on the physical plane, are expressive of the fact that the notion of substance has no more place in fundamental physics: in a world in which only relations exist, I submit, Einsteinian relativity reigns supreme.[2]

It should be noted that there is evidently no heliocentrism based upon cognitive sense perception. Nonetheless, apart from what I have termed physical heliocentrism, there is a renowned heliocentrism championed by Galileo, which insists, supposedly on scientific grounds, that the Earth does move. One sees, however, that in claiming to have demonstrated the motion of the Earth, Galileo was in fact mistaken: his celebrated "Eppur Si Muove" remains to this day unproved. What 1 shall term Galilean heliocentrism turns out to be a bastard notion, a spurious hybrid, one can say, of the aforesaid two ways of knowing.

There is also, however, a third kind of heliocentrism, which might be termed traditional, iconic, and even perhaps esoteric; we will consider that heliocentrism in due course. But first it behooves us to reflect in some depth on the meaning and significance of the primary geocentrism.

It has been said that the geocentrist worldview is suited to the mentality of the so-called primitive man, someone who accepts the testimony of the senses uncritically and is supposedly incapable of scientific thought. One maintains, moreover, that human perception is inherently unreliable and subject to manifold illusions, which need to be rectified through scientific means. Even scientists admit, of course, that sense perception does indeed constitute our one and only

means of access to the external world; but one denies that it can per se bestow an authentic and accurate knowledge of things as they are. For that one needs to supplement the human faculties by scientific instruments, and avail oneself of the theories which underlie their use. The role of sense perception in the cognitive process is thus reduced ultimately to elementary acts, such as the reading of a pointer on a scale.

Oversimplified as this brief characterization of the scienceoriented epistemology may be, it does serve to identify the contemporary scientistic denigration of sense perception as a serious and respectable way of knowing. To the scientistic mentality the modus operandi of science appears as the sole legitimate means for the acquisition of authentic knowledge; as Bernand Russell once put it: "What science cannot tell us, mankind cannot know." But of course this is far from being the case! We need to understand from the outset that cognitive sense perception can give access to domains of reality beyond the range of scientific inquiry, and that in our daily life it does in fact give access to an authentic world which physical science as such cannot know. We need to remind ourselves that cognitive perception is neither a physiological nor indeed a psychological act, but is consummated in the intellect, the highest faculty within the human compound. So high, in fact, is that faculty, that according to Platonist philosophers it transcends the categories of space and time. Cognitive sense perception, thus, even in its humblest quotidian manifestations, proves to be something quite miraculous, something literally "not of this world." Moreover, in view of the fact that it constitutes our normal God-given means of knowing the external world, its scientistic denigration, I say, is not only fallacious, but impious as well. What actually limits the truth and the depth of human perception are not our faculties as such, but the use we make of them; and one should add that in this regard a collective decline appears to have been in progress since earliest times. It seems likely, moreover, that the scientistic denigration has itself had a debilitating effect upon our capacity to perceive, and has in fact accelerated our collective descent from the pristine state, a state in which, according to sacred tradition, man had the ability to penetrate "the things that are made" so as to apprehend "the invisible things of God" which they exemplify. The evolution of the scientistic outlook constitutes thus a late phase in that age old descent which St. Paul has characterized as a "darkening of the heart." It is no doubt a fine line that separates true science from scientistic negation; yet we are told in no uncertain terms that those who cross that line are "without excuse." In words which appear to have lost none of their relevance, the Apostle describes the resultant condition of these perpetrators: "Professing themselves to be wise," he declares, "they became fools." (Rom. 1:20-22)

Having alluded to the collective decline which our powers of perception have suffered, it is to be noted that even in this diminished state we are yet able to behold a world that is truly sublime, and incomparably richer-and more real! than the universe disclosed by the methods of physical science. To be sure, the scientific way of knowing has its validity and its corresponding ontological domain, as does the way of perception; but the latter, one is obliged to say; is the greater of the two. For it is by way of cognitive perception that we can know not merely the quantitative and material components of being, but can ascend to a knowledge of essences, and even, Deo volente, to a perception of "the invisible things of God."

Getting back to the question of geocentrism, it is to be noted that the worldview at which one arrives through sense perception is perforce geocentric. Now, in light of the preceding reflections, this fact, so far from constituting some kind of stigma, bestows in itself a certain legitimacy and indeed a certain primacy upon the geocentric Weltanschauung. One can say of the latter that it constitutes the normal human outlook, which as such cannot be illegitimate or void of truth. What we learn by way of our senses is that the Earth we stand upon reposes at the center of the universe, and that the Sun, Moon, planets and stars revolve around the Earth. It is true - as we have been told often enough - that the geocentrist outlook is suited to the understanding of simple arid untutored minds; but it is equally true that this worldview is congenial to the understanding of sages and saints.

The traditional doctrine of geocentrism is based upon the conception of the Stellatum, the sphere of the stars, which rotates diurnally around the Earth. Between the Stellatum and the Earth there are the planets, the "wanderers," which differ visibly from the stars by the complexity of their apparent motions. What is of primary significance, however, is the underlying two-sphere architecture of the cosmos: the notion of an outermost sphere, comprised of stars, in perpetual revolution about the Earth, conceived as the innermost sphere. It is crucial to understand that the distinction between the two spheres, so far from being merely cosmographical, is primarily ontological, which is to say that the respective spheres represent two distinct ontologic domains, two worlds, if you will; and it is worth noting that to this day one speaks of "spheres" in a distinctly ontologic sense. It is likewise crucial to understand that the two worlds-the stellar and the terrestrial-define a hierarchic order: that the stellar world, namely, is "higher" than the terrestrial: and again I would point out that the adjectives "high" and "low" have to this day retained their hierarchic connotation. One sees thus that the two-sphere conception of the cosmos defines a dimension of verticality which is at once cosmographic, ontologic, and axiological. The immensity of spatial distance separating our Earth from the stellar sphere becomes thus indicative of the stupendous hiatus, both ontologic and axiological, separating the two domains. To be sure, the stellar world is not to be identified with the spiritual, which is metacosmic and invisible to mortal gaze; but yet, as the highest cosmic sphere, the stellar world reflects the spiritual to a preeminent degree. According to ancient belief, there is an intimate connection between the stellar and the angelic realm, the realm of the so-called gods. The Earth, on the other hand, occupies the lowest position within the cosmic hierarchy, and this again is to be understood in a threefold sense.

These somewhat sparse indications may perhaps suffice to provide an initial glimpse of what geocentric cosmology is about. One sees that with his telescope and his polemics, Galileo had assaulted far more than a mere cosmography. It was not simply a question of whether the Earth does or does not move-whatever that might mean! Nor was it simply a question of whether the Galilean claim contradicts certain passages in Scripture, such as when the Good Book speaks of the Sun as "rising," or as "running its course." What stands at issue, clearly, is nothing less than an entire Weltanschauung. It is in fact the notion of cosmic hierarchy, of "verticality" in the traditional sense, that has come under attack. But let us note that this notion is intimately connected to the conception of spiritual ascent. One may object on the grounds that it is surely possible to "ascend" spiritually without flying up into the sky; but whereas the spiritual or metaphysical sense of verticality needs indeed to be distinguished from the cosmographic, it yet remains that the two are profoundly related. It is not mere imagination or pious poetry that Christ - and before Him, Enoch and Elias - "was taken up, and a cloud received him out of their sight." (Acts 1:9) The question remains, moreover, whether the two senses of verticality can in fact be separated on an existential plane, and whether the cosmographic sense may not indeed play a vital role in the spiritual life. One wonders whether an individual who thinks, a la Einstein, that "one coordinate system is as good as another," can in fact maintain a living belief in the possibility of spiritual ascent. What counts spiritually, as one knows, is what we believe with our entire being: inclusive, one is tempted to say, of the body itself, the corporeal component of our nature. Does not the First Commandment exhort us to love God "with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy might"? There can be little doubt that the ternary heart-soul-might corresponds to the Pauline pneuma psyche-soma, which is to say that we are enjoined to love God not only with our spiritual and mental faculties, but with our corporeal being as well. Moreover, in line with this basic principle, the Church has decreed that the literal or "corporeal" sense of Scripture must not be denied,[1] must not be simply jettisoned, as contemporary theologians are wont to do. Authentic Christianity has always rejected angelism in any of its manifestations; if man is indeed a trichotomous being, his religious convictions and discipline need to be in a sense trichotomous as well. Getting back to the basic concept of verticality, it follows, then, that the cosmographic sense cannot be cast aside with impunity; and I would add that history appears to bear this out. It is surely not accidental that in the wake of the Copernican Revolution religious faith has visibly waned. In the more educated strata of society, at least, belief in the teachings of Christianity, to the extent that it has survived at all, has become strangely hollow, and conspicuously lacking in the force of existential conviction. There are notable exceptions, to be sure, but the overall trend is unmistakable; in a very real sense, Western man has forfeited his spiritual orientation. Having suffered the loss of cosmographic verticality, he finds himself in a flattened-out universe in which the concerns of authentic religion make little sense. Let it not be said that religion or spirituality have no need of a cosmology: nothing could be further from the truth. As Oskar Milosz has wisely observed: "Unless a man's concept of the physical universe accords with reality, his spiritual life will be crippled at its roots": yes, it is happening before our very eyes! Getting back to Galileo and his famous trial, one cannot but commend the Church for rallying to the defense of a position which in truth is its own.

It is vital to understand that geocentric cosmology is inherently an iconic doctrine. It pertains thus to the traditional sciences as distinguished from the modern, which are concerned with the material and thus non-iconic aspects of cosmic reality. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr explains:

The modern sciences also know nature, but no longer as an icon. They are able to tell us about the size, weight and shape of the icon and even the composition of the various colors of paint used in painting it, but they can tell us nothing of its meaning in reference to a reality beyond itself.[2]

This is a very apt illustration, and a most enlightening one. A great deal of misunderstanding and confusion in the debate over geocentrism could have been avoided if the disputants on both sides had realized that the geocentrist claim is to be understood as an iconic truth, a truth which transcends the domain of the modern physical sciences. In reality geocentrism has to do with meaning, with cosmic symbolism, and thus with the mystery of essence. It is not a truth which can be defined, let alone demonstrated, on a positivistic plane.

Having characterized geocentrism as an iconic doctrine, it may be well to point out that what stands at issue is not a matter of symbolism in some psychological sense, but a matter, rather, of objective truth. Geocentrism is thus a scientific doctrine, one which pertains, as I have said before, to the province of the traditional sciences. As such it demands a certain ability to "see," to enter into a superior mode of vision, a mode that is able to discern the meaning of the icon as distinguished from mere "shapes and colors." The contemporary scientist, on the other hand, has been trained to fix his gaze precisely upon the outermost aspects of corporeal reality: is it any wonder that he misses the iconic sense? After considerable schooling one learns to reduce the icon to mere shape and color: reduce the universe, that is, to its material and quantitative components. And so it comes about that the true meaning of geocentrism generally escapes not only its scientific critics, but its contemporary scientific defenders as well.[3] The debate rages, more often than not, over the outer husk.

Not only the reality, however, but the very conception of science in the traditional sense, has been virtually lost in the modern West. Even theologians, who should know better, have for the most part not a clue: if they had, they would not have busied themselves with the task of "demythologizing" sacred texts. Why this blindness? It is not a question of erudition, or even perhaps of "faith" in the religious sense; what is needed is a traditional ambience, something which in the West has disappeared centuries ago. Nasr is no doubt profoundly right when he compares the traditional sciences to "jewels which glow in the presence of the light of a living sapiential tradition and become opaque once that light disappears."[4] We need to realize that this marvelous metaphor applies not only to various recondite disciplines, such as alchemy or astrology but likewise to geocentrism, the meaning of which everyone presumes to understand. Given that cosmic realities are connected to their exemplars by way of essence, it follows that a worldview in which essence has been lost is one in which no traditional science - be it geocentrism or any other - can find recognition. Such a science may of course survive in its outer forms, even as the shapes and colors of an icon remain visible when its meaning has been lost. Geocentrism, in particular, may survive in its cosmographic dimension; thus reduced, however, to its external sense, it becomes in effect a superstition: a mere vestige of a forgotten worldview. In terms of Professor Nasr's metaphor, geocentrism has thus become "opaque."

Geocentric cosmology, whether conceived Ptolemaically or according to the Tychonian system … affirms that the stars and the seven classical planets - Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury and Moon - are engaged in ceaseless revolution around the Earth, as if mounted on giant rotating spheres. In short, the heavens revolve while the Earth stands still: what is the significance of that? To the ancients it meant that the stars and planets are principles of motion in the terrestrial sphere. Even as the Sun gives rise to the alternation of day and night, and of the seasons, and the Moon gives rise to oceanic tides and other phenomena, so it is with the stars and the five remaining planets: such was the ancient belief. Astronomy and astrology were thus bound together as complementary aspects of a single science. One must not forget that Ptolemy has left us not only his Almagest - the most comprehensive and influential treatise on astronomy produced in antiquity - but also the Tetrabiblos; which deals with predictive astrology.

Given that the celestial spheres do indeed exert an influence upon the terrestrial world, how, let us ask, is that influence transmitted to the sublunar realm? At the hands of Aristotle this question received a rather physical answer: Having convinced himself on philosophical grounds that there can be no such thing as empty space, and persuaded that the celestial spheres are composed of an element termed the aether, Aristotle thought that each sphere exerts a kind of mechanical force upon the next, from the Stellatum down to the terrestrial. And since the latter sphere does not move, the result must be a mixing of the elements, and thus the production of internal motion and change. Such, at least, is the apparent sense of the Aristotelian doctrine. It seems, however, that earlier conceptions of stellar influence had been far more theological than physical, if one may put it so; we must remember that preceding civilizations had populated the heavens with gods or angels, as we prefer to say - who presumably disposed over more spiritual means of communicating their influence to the sublunar realm. But be this as it may, the celestial spheres were evidently conceived as "active" in relation to the terrestrial, which is to say that the worldview of these early civilizations was inherently astrological.

This basic feature of ancient cosmology has of course been abandoned in the wake of the Copernican Revolution. Copernicus himself tried hard to salvage as much as he could of the old cosmology; he was by no means a revolutionary or an iconoclast. Yet, by a kind of relentless logic, his astronomical innovation did precipitate the collapse of the ancient worldview: in the minds and imagination of those who, following Copernicus, came to espouse the heliocentric cosmography, astrology became a dead issue. For now the Earth itself revolves, and presumably acts upon other planets, even as these act upon the Earth. The new cosmology is visibly democratic: the traditional hierarchy, in which the Earth had been relegated to the lowest position, has been replaced by a planetary system in which the terrestrial globe enjoys more or less equal status with its six companion planets. There is now no more up and 'down, no more east and west,' 'north' and 'south,' except of course in relation to a particular planet orbiting the Sun. Clearly, the very basis for an astrological outlook has disappeared.

In the new cosmology, the stars and classical planets no longer exert an influence upon the Earth; or better said, no longer exert a "higher" influence. According to contemporary physics, there is an interaction via gravitational and electromagnetic forces; and certainly, in that sense, the Sun, Moon and stars still affect the Earth. But it is needless to point out that the action of forces or exchange of particles admitted by the physics of our day are nothing like the "influence of the celestial spheres" as conceived in ancient lore - which is of course precisely the reason why the very idea of astrology appears to us today as a primitive and indeed exploded superstition.

Iconic truth has to do with the relation of a cosmic to a metacosmic reality. However, since every cosmic entity is related to the metacosmic realms in multiple ways, it exemplifies a multiplicity of iconic truths. To read a cosmic icon, therefore, it is needful to make a choice; or better said: to engage in a particular perspective or point of view. What one beholds depends, so to speak, upon one's angle of vision; and as we change our point of vantage, the resultant perception may formally contradict the preceding cognition.

Having spoken of geocentrism as an iconic doctrine, I would like now to point out that heliocentrism, rightly understood, constitutes an iconic doctrine as well. The two seemingly rival contentions, thus, are both correct, which is to say that each embodies an iconic truth; it is the perspective, the point of view, that differs. More precisely: the two doctrines correspond to different levels of vision. The heliocentric position corresponds evidently to a more intellectual or internal kind of vision, inasmuch as it contradicts what might be termed the testimony of sense perception. Its iconic truth, moreover, derives from the fact that the Sun, as the representative of Deity, does by right occupy the center of the universe. As "the author not only of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth" … the Sun could not be conceived Ptolemaically as a mere planet, one among several that revolve about the Earth. Considering the overtly theophanic, one might almost say, "liturgical" outlook of the traditional heliocentric orientation, it is hardly surprising that heliocentrism has been especially associated with the Pythagorean and Platonist traditions, as opposed to the Aristotelian. Based on the report of Philolaus, the Pythagoreans espoused a non-geocentric cosmology in which the Earth revolves around a central fire, the so-called Altar of the Universe, which however was apparently not identified with the Sun. That identification came about later at the hands of the Neoplatonists, whose cosmology thus became overtly heliocentric. Later still, in the Renaissance movement championed by Marsilio Ficino, the doctrine came alive again, but in a somewhat altered form; one might say that what Ficino instituted was indeed a religion, a kind of neopaganism. Copernicus himself was profoundly influenced by this movement, as can be clearly seen from numerous passages in the De Revolutionibus. To cite but one example (from the tenth chapter of the First Book) which enables us to savor the spirit of those Renaissance times:

In the middle of all sits the Sun enthroned. In this

most beautiful temple, could we place this luminary

in any better position from which he can illuminate

the whole at once? He is rightly called the Lamp, the

Mind, the Ruler of the Universe; Hermes Trismegistus

names him the Visible God, Sophocles' Electra

calls him the All-seeing. So the Sun sits as upon a royal

throne ruling his children the planets which circle

round him.

Yet despite these panegyrics, it appears that the light of iconic truth was fast fading. A kind of earth-bound literalism, hostile to the spirit of Platonic philosophy, was beginning to manifest itself, foreboding the advent of the modern age. Neither in Marsilio Ficino nor in Copernicus do we encounter an authentic revival of Platonist doctrine, nor can it be said that the resultant heliocentristn conforms altogether to its traditional prototype: "rather was it comparable," writes Titus Burckhardt. "to the dangerous popularization of an esoteric truth." ….

It behooves us to ponder this highly significant statement. Why should the truth of heliocentrism be "esoteric"? And why should its popularization be "dangerous"? We have already characterized the truth of authentic heliocentrism as "iconic"; are we perhaps to conclude that "iconic" and "esoteric" are one and the same? But by that token, authentic geocentrism would be "esoteric" as well. I propose to give at least a partial answer to these questions. Let it be noted, first of all, that there is a prima facie opposition, a kind of logical contradiction, between the geocentric and the heliocentric claims. It is to be noted, furthermore, that heliocentrism is based upon an intellective vision which replaces or supersedes the sensory. The crucial point, however, is that authentic heliocentrism does not deny that sensory truth, but accommodates it, rather, within an enlarged and perforce hierarchic vision of reality. Vivekananda has put it well when he said that "Man does not move from error to truth, but from truth to truth: from truth that is lower to truth that is higher." This toleration and indeed recognition of lower truth, I say, constitutes a mark of authentic esoterism. The higher truth is never destructive of the lower: quite to the contrary! A so-called esoterism, therefore, which undercuts the normal and in a sense God-given beliefs of mankind is perforce a false esoterism. Christ Himself has said: "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill." And by way of further emphasis, He added: "For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." (Matt. 5:17,18) To be sure, Christ is speaking presumably of the Mosaic law, and not of cosmology; yet even so I surmise that His words do also apply to the body of basic beliefs grounded in the Old Testament tradition, which certainly includes geocentrism. Till "heaven and earth pass," all these "lower truths" shall remain effective and binding upon us: let no man cast them off before he has actually attained the higher - before "heaven and earth have passed away" - on pain of falling into what an Upanishad calls "a greater darkness."

Getting back to the prima facie contradiction between the geocentrist and the heliocentrist claims, I would like now to point out that this conflict cannot be resolved on the level of our ordinary "common sense" views concerning physical or corporeal reality. Nor indeed can it be resolved on an Aristotelian basis, let alone a Cartesian. It needs to be resolved on the ground of a Platonist - or if you will, a Vendantistmetaphysics: no lesser realism, it appears, will do. And yes, that ground is indeed "esoteric," to say the least.

There can be little doubt, moreover, that this too is the ground upon which Dante conceived his monumental vision of what might be termed the integral cosmos. In a single poetic cosmography he combined, if you will, the geocentrist and the heliocentrist cosmologies; and it is highly significant that one passes from the former to the latter precisely at the Empyrian, which thus represents the boundary, as it were, between the two "worlds." For indeed, as one crosses that boundary, the ascending spheres no longer expand, but now contract; in that supernal and indeed angelic realm, the hierarchic ordering of successive spheres is reversed: here to "ascend" means to approach the center, where stands the Altar of the Universe, the Throne of God. The Empyrean, thus the outermost Ptolemaic sphere - marks the point of reversal, where "heaven and earth shall pass," which is also the point where "a new heaven and a new earth" shall come to be." (Is. 65:17, Rev. 12:1)

There question arises whether the preeminence of authentic heliocentrism may not be reflected on the physical plane in some corresponding cosmographieal preeminence. Does not the very principle of cosmic symbolism demand that the superior glory of the true heliocentric vision be mirrored somehow in the actual geometry of the planetary system? I submit that what Copernicus refers to as "a wonderful symmetry in the universe, and a definite relation of harmony in the motion and magnitude of the orbs, of a kind not possible to obtain in any other way," is none other than that reflection. Admittedly, the Copernican and the Tychonian systems prove to be mathematically equivalent,[5] which is to say that they predict the same apparent orbits; yet even so, the symmetries and harmony of which Copernicus speaks with justified ardor remain hidden in the Tychonian scheme, while they become resplendently manifest in the Copernican. One has mixed feelings, therefore, concerning the contemporary defense of geocentrism. Christian believers do well in guarding a doctrine which proves to be basic to their faith; but the reductionist spirit of the times has forced the debate onto a cosmographic plane where the essential has already been lost, and where the defenders find themselves at a distinct disadvantage. As 1 have noted before, the principle of relativity has offered a certain protection to the beleaguered Tychonians; but at the same time it has rendered the geocentrist cause hopeless on physical ground. Meanwhile the fact remains that a heliocentric coordinate system offers undeniable theoretical advantages precisely because it is adapted to the symmetries Copernicus had his eye upon: the very symmetries that bear witness to the heliocentric truth. The Tychonians may be right in claiming that they too can explain the observable facts, but one wonders at what cost in the form of ad hoc interventions. …. There is something pathetic in the spectacle of these defenders, whom the opposing side does not deem worthy even of a response.

What necessarily baffles the exoterist mentality is what might be termed the multivalency of authentic revelation, be it scriptural or cosmic. Truth is hierarchical, and so Scripture and the cosmos itself need be in a sense hierarchical as well. No single perspective or level of understanding, no single "darshana," can do full justice to the integral truth: revelation itself informs us of this fact in various ways. Typically both Scripture and the cosmic revelation do so by way of "fissures," that is to say, by way of seeming incongruities which disturb and puzzle us, and hopefully spur us on to seek a higher level of truth. As Christ Himself intimated to His disciples on the eve before His passion: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."(John 16:12) Humility in the moral sense is not enough: we need also an intellectual and indeed theological humility. To preserve ourselves from falling into some arid dogmatism, we need ever to continue on our way: "from truth that is lower to truth that is higher." Dogmas, it seems, are meant for the viator, the spiritual traveler, not for the armchair theologian. It is not that dogmas of a sacred kind are simply provisional or limited in the ordinary sense, but rather that they harbor unsuspected truths. We need, as I have said, to continue on our way; as the author of Hebrews points out: "Strong meat belongeth to them that are full of age."(Heb. 5:14) Moreover, since truth derives ultimately from God, this progressive ascent constitutes indeed an itinerarium mentis in Deum, a "journey into God." But clearly, it is a journey in which the viator himself is progressively changed; in the words of St. Paul: "But we all with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord. "(2 Cor. 3:18)

As I have noted before, the higher truth of heliocentrism is reflected in the superior beauty or "symmetry" of the corresponding mathematical description; but one must remember that the "high truth" in question pertains to what may indeed be termed an esoteric level of vision. Reduced to a scientific theory in the contemporary sense - a mere cosmography - heliocentrism ranks in reality below its geocentric rival; as I have pointed out, the latter doctrine, limited though it be, corresponds to the testimony of human sense perception, and opens therefore upon vistas of truth which must remain forever unknown to the physical scientist as such. The problem with an "exoteric" geocentrism, on the other hand - a geocentrism that simply denies the heliocentric truth - is that it ultimately lacks a credible defense against a scientific heliocentrism: referents and epicycles, figuratively speaking, do not stand up well against the equations of Kepler and Newton. Even the most committed geocentrist can hardly fail to recognize a superior cogency in the heliocentric theory, and secretly sense that another truth must stand at issue, a truth which is not comprehended within the geocentric outlook. But alas, on a strictly exoteric plane that other truth becomes perforce hostile, perforce threatening to the integrity of the geocentric worldview. What by right should spur us on to seek a higher, more comprehensive level of understanding - what by right should be liberating - comes thus to be feared and rejected as a rank heresy.

The situation, however, is further complicated by the circumstance that heliocentrism has generally come to be identified with the Galilean doctrine, which is in fact a rank heresy. I have already argued that Galilean heliocentrism erodes the sense of verticality which supports and indeed enables the spiritual life: that it plunges us into a flattened and de-essentialized cosmos in which the claims of religion cease to be credible. I propose now to consider another ill effect of the Galilean heresy, which in a way is complementary to the aforesaid loss of verticality.

Every religion is perforce homocentric in its worldview. To put it in Christian terms: Man occupies a central position in the universe because he is made in the image and likeness of Him who is the absolute center of all that exists. Furthermore, man is central because, as the microcosm, he in a way contains within himself all that exists in the outer world, even as the center of a circle contains in a sense the full pencil of radii. Or again, man is central because he is the most precious among corporeal beings. In fact, Genesis teaches that God created the Earth as a habitat for man, and the Sun, Moon, and stars "for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years." It is on account of man's centrality, moreover, that the Fall of Adam could affect the entire universe. Now, it is true that the centrality of which we speak is above all metaphysical, or mystical, as one might also say; yet even so, it is in the nature of things that this "essential" centrality should be reflected cosmographically. Does not the outer manifestation invariably mirror the inner or essential reality? To suppose that man can be metaphysically central while inhabiting a speck of matter occupying some nondescript position in some nondescript galaxy - that would surely be incongruous in the extreme. Once again: it would deny the very principle of cosmic symbolism, and thus the theophanic nature of cosmic reality. To be sure, it is possible, on an abstract philosophic lane, to affirm metaphysical centrality and cosmographic acentrality in same breath; I doubt, however, that one can do so on an existential level, that is to say, in point of actual credence. To the extent that we truly believe the stipulated acentrality of the Earth, we are bound to relinquish the traditional claim of homocentrism: in reality, I say, these two articles of belief are mutually exclusive. One can, of course, pay lip-service to both, as contemporary theologians might do; but actual belief - that is something else entirely.

The objection may be raised that it is indeed possible to espouse an acentric cosmology without detriment to the rightful claims of religion; and one might point to Nicholas of Cusa by way of substantiating that contention. True enough! One needs however to understand that the Cusan cosmology is profoundly Platonic, and corresponds, once again, to an authentically esoteric point of view. Its so-called acentrality is consequently worlds removed from the contemporary relativistic acentrality, and could be more accurately termed a "pancentrality." By the same token, moreover, the Cardinal does not simply deny the geocentrist claim, as does the Galilean astronomer: in reality he transcends the geocentrist contention, and in so doing, paradoxically, justifies and founds it "in spirit and in truth." "It is no less true," declares Nicholas of Cusa, "that the center of the world is within the Earth than that it is outside the Earth"; for indeed, "the Blessed God is also the center of the Earth, of all spheres, of all things in the world." Here, in this terse and lucid statement worthy of a sanctified mind, we breathe the pure and invigorating air of a Christian esoterism. It is ever the way of authentic esoterism to "deny" only by affirming a higher truth, which contains but vastly exceeds the original claim.

It is true that the Earth enshrines the center of the universe; but so do the Sun, the Moon, and the myriad stars. Yet it is evidently the first of these recognitions that matters most to us so long as we are denizens of this terrestrial world. As I have noted before, we depend upon that recognition, that truth, for our orientation: our spiritual orientation no less than our physical.

What happens, now, when we ascend from a geocentric to an authentically heliocentric worldview: do we retain the original homocentrism? One may surmise that as we transcend the geocentric outlook, we likewise transcend the lesser theological conception of homocentrism, in accordance with the Pauline dictum: "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."(Gal. 2:20) The resultant and indeed higher homocentrism is in reality a Christocentrism; but again, that Christocentrism is not destructive of the earlier notion, the lesser truth - even as the Christ who "liveth in me" is not destructive of the "I" that "lives." It is once again a question of levels, of hierarchy. Meanwhile the intrinsic connection between geocentrism and the lesser homocentrism endures on the plane to which either notion applies, which is none other than the plane corresponding to our human condition. Let no one therefore deny either of these notions, either of these truths, "from below": the consequences of that denial cannot but be tragic in the extreme. Such a denial of either truth affects and indeed "poisons" every aspect of human culture, beginning with the life of religion, which it undermines.

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[1] In 1909, in a ruling on “The Historical Character of the Earlier Chapters of Genesis,” the Pontifical Biblical Commission denied the validity of “exegetical systems” which exclude the literal sense of Genesis. See Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma (London: Herder, 1957), 2121-2128. It is to be noted that Pope St. Pius X, in his Motu proprio of 1907, “Prestantia Scripturae”, has declared the rulings of the Biblical Commission to be binding. See Denzinger, 2113.

[2] The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2001), 487.

[3] It may surprise some readers to learn that geocentrism still has scientific advocates. One of the best-known today is Gerardus Bouw, director of the Association for Biblical Astronomy, and editor of Biblical Astronomer, a journal dedicated to the scientific defense of geocentrism. See also his treatise Geocentricity (Cleveland: Association for Biblical Astronomy, 1992).

[4] Op. cit., 488.

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